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Introduction
In response to a perceived cost and access crisis, President Clin-
ton has proposed a dramatic reorganization of the American health
care industry.' A controversial feature of the Clinton proposal is its
strategy of using price controls to limit health care spending. Under
the plan, a national health board would set national and regional ex-
penditure caps.2 In order to enforce these caps, health plan premiums
(and, in turn, provider payments) would be reduced pro rata by an
amount necessary to bring spending into compliance.3 The Clinton
proposal also provides for separate controls on the prices of physician
services under "fee for service" health plans.4
Opponents of the Clinton plan, chiefly organized medicine, have
charged that the plan's price controls could amount to an unconstitu-
tional regulatory taking.- If prices are set too low, they argue, provid-
ers would be deprived of the economic benefit of investments in their
professional practices or facilities in violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment. Drawing on precedent protecting public utilities against confis-
catory rate regulation, opponents contend that prices under the
Clinton plan must be set at a level that gives providers the opportunity
to recoup their costs plus a reasonable return. They also claim that
1. See Health Security Act, H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter
HSA].
2. Id. §§ 6001-6003.
3. Id. §§ 6011, 6012.
4. Id. § 1322(c).
5. See Edward Felsenthal, AMA to Fight Limits on Doctors' Fees, WALL ST. J., Sept.
9, 1993, at B7; Brian McCormick, Constitutional fights loom on reform plan, AM. MED.
NEWS, Oct. 25, 1993, at 3; Robert Pear, Doctors Planning Battle Against Health Care Prov-
iders, N.Y. TMms, June 15, 1993, at A20. The legal theory on which the AMA's opposition
to price controls is grounded is explained in a memorandum prepared by the AMA's coun-
sel, Sidley & Austin. See generally Memorandum from Sidley & Austin to American Medi-
cal Association (June 1993) [hereinafter AMA Memorandum] (copy on file with the
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly).
6. See AMA Memorandum, supra note 5, at 3-18.
government must establish procedures for individualized rate-setting
to take into account cost variations among providers.
7
The argument that price controls in the health care industry
might amount to a regulatory taking is facially attractive. Price regu-
lation is questionable policy,8 and is one of the most unpopular forms
of government intervention. Moreover, the public utility cases, rooted
in regulatory takings doctrine, provide ostensible legal precedent for
the position.
This Article argues that, despite the facial appeal of a regulatory
takings challenge to health care price controls, the Fifth Amendment
places no significant limits on industry-wide health care price regula-
tion. Part I argues that the property interests at stake in health care
price regulation are identical to the "economic liberty" interests pro-
tected under substantive due process doctrine during the Lochner9
era. As a result, regulatory takings doctrine cannot be expanded to
include economic scrutiny of price controls without creating the sorts
of tensions between the legislative and judicial branches that ulti-
mately led to Lochner's demise.
Part II argues that, despite the unavailability of other constitu-
tional limitations on redistributive regulation, the legislative process is
itself likely to provide significant protection for the economic interests
of health care providers. Moreover, even if legislatures do not safe-
guard provider interests, courts would face an impossible task in de-
termining whether health care providers have suffered or benefited
from government policy taken as a whole.
Part III examines the balancing test traditionally employed by the
Court in regulatory takings cases. The test suggests that, like most
other regulatory takings claims, a challenge to price controls in the
health care sector is likely to fail.
Part IV demonstrates that the public utility rate-setting cases
upon which potential regulatory takings claimants might rely are dis-
tinguishable from the Court's judgments in other takings cases. The
mere fact that Congress has regulated prices, as opposed to other fea-
tures of the health care market, justifies no special constitutional
scrutiny.
7. Id. at 18-21.
8. See, e.g., Elizabeth McCaughey, Price Controls on Health Care, WALL ST. J., Nov.
22, 1993, at A14.
9. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see discussion infra Part I.B.
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I. Regulatory Takings and Substantive Due Process
A. Regulatory Takings
Until Justice Holmes' famous opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon,10 the reach of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment
was limited to "physical appropriation" of private property." In
Mahon, however, the Supreme Court held that if government regula-
tion diminished the value of property significantly enough, the Tak-
ings Clause might require compensation even though government did
not take physical possession of the property.12 Justice Holmes rea-
soned that regulations preventing the profitable exploitation of one's
property have "very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes
as appropriating or destroying it.' 3 In the same opinion, however,
Holmes noted that, as a practical matter, the regulatory takings idea
could not be pressed to its logical extreme: "Government hardly could
go on if, to some extent, values incident to property could not be di-
minished without paying for every such change in the general law."' 4
The Court has never found a conceptually consistent approach
for reconciling the tensions expressed in the Mahon opinion. Reading
Mahon to prohibit uncompensated redistributive regulation alto-
gether would recognize that the economic effects of regulation may be
just as severe as those of "physical takings," but at the price of impos-
ing enormous practical burdens on government. Reading Mahon
more narrowly, on the other hand, would force some citizens to bear
uncompensated burdens, but would let government operate without
subjecting the incidental effects of its every decision to judicial
scrutiny.15
In effect, the Court has reached a practical accommodation of
these two conflicting policies. It decides regulatory takings cases using
a combination of ad hoc balancing and per se rules. If a regulation
10. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
11. See id. at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (noting that state did not, through the regu-
lations challenged in Mahon, "appropriate [the restricted property] or make any use of
it"); see also Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887) (holding that prohibition on use
of property pursuant to police powers "cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an
appropriation of property for public benefit"); JoHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CON TrrUTIONAL LAW § 11.12, at 427 (4th ed. 1991) (characterizing pre-Mahon takings
jurisprudence as turning on whether there was a "physical appropriation").
12. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413.
13. Id. at 414.
14. Id. at 413.
15. See generally Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a
Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 561, 587-97 (1984) (describing the fundamental tension in
Mahon as between wealth maximization and civic virtue).
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amounts to a physical invasion of property16 or prevents all economi-
cally beneficial use of land,17 compensation is due without further in-
quiry. Otherwise, the Court balances three factors in deciding
regulatory takings cases: the nature of the governmental interest in
the challenged regulation, the extent of the resulting diminution in
value, and the nature of the expectations unrealized pursuant to the
regulation.'8 Practically speaking, however, unless the regulatory tak-
ings claim can be forced into a per se category, it will almost certainly
fail: the Court has "never once clearly applied the open-ended balanc-
ing test in favor of a takings claim and against a regulating
government."'19
B. Substantive Due Process Compared
The Court's pragmatic constriction of regulatory takings doctrine
bears a strong resemblance to its abandonment of Lochner-era sub-
stantive due process protection of economic liberties.20 In the Loch-
ner era, the Supreme Court frequently invalidated business regulation
that diminished "freedom of contract" or otherwise adversely affected
vested economic interests.2' Judicial nullification of New Deal legisla-
tion eventually led to a political conflict between President Roosevelt
16. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1993) (citing
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)).
17. Id. at 2893 (citing Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Key-
stone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1986); Hodel v. Virginia Sur-
face Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S.
255 (1980)). Public utility regulation constitutes an additional category of per se takings.
See discussion infra Part IV.A.
18. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978). The three-
part test has been most recently employed in Concrete Pipe & Products, Inc. v. Construc-
tion Laborers Pension Trust, 113 S. Ct. 2264, 2289 (1993).
19. Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. RFv. 1600, 1621 (1988). Since
Michelman wrote, the Court's only decision in favor a regulatory takings claimant has been
Lucas. Lucas rested on the trial court's finding that the regulated land was "rendered
valueless by [government] enforcement of [a] coastal-zone construction ban." Lucas, 112
S. Ct. at 2896. The Court thus applied a per se rule requiring compensation unless "the
proscribed use interests were not part of [the landowner's] title to begin with." Id. at 2899.
20. In the technical sense, the Court did not "abandon" substantive due process re-
view of economic legislation. It merely reduced the degree of scrutiny to the minimal
"rational basis" standard. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 8-7, at 582 ("[T]he Court
never wholly abandoned the position that legislatures, at least in their regulatory capacity,
must always act in furtherance of public goals transcending the shifting summation of pri-
vate interests through the political process.").
21. See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 11, § 11.3; TRIBE, supra note 20, §§ 8-2 to 8-
Sp~ring 19941
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and the Court 2 When the judiciary yielded, it became settled that
whatever protection of economic interests against majoritarian ex-
ploitation the Constitution provided lay largely in the legislative pro-
cess itself.' No distinct constitutional crisis precipitated the Court's
generally cautious approach to the Takings Clause. Nevertheless, one
reason for the Court's refusal to give the Clause broader application
has surely been to avoid conflict with the elected branches.24
The economic interests protected in the Lochner era and those
asserted by claimants in regulatory takings challenges to economic
regulation are also strikingly similar. A business making a regulatory
takings claim alleges, by definition, that government regulation has
diminished the value of its property.25 In economic terms, the busi-
ness claims that the challenged regulation has diminished the income
stream that would otherwise be associated with ownership and opera-
tion of the property.26 Because assets generate revenues through mar-
ket transactions, the regulatory takings claimant is arguing that, but
for the regulation, it could have exploited its property more success-
fully by bargaining on more favorable terms. This is exactly what par-
ties in the Lochner era argued when they challenged government
regulation based on "liberty of contract". But for the challenged reg-
ulation, they argued, it would have been possible to purchase labor
more cheaply,27 extract commitments from employees not to engage
22. See LEO PEFFER, THIS HONORABLE COURT 295-320 (1965); see also Franklin D.
Roosevelt, Reorganizing the Federal Judiciary, in FREE GovERNMENT n THE MAKING
679-82 (A.T. Mason & G.E. Baker eds., 4th ed. 1985) (transcript of Roosevelt's radio ad-
dress arguing for his court-packing plan).
23. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731-32 (1963) ("We refuse to sit as a
'superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation .... ' The Kansas debt adjusting stat-
ute [challenged in Ferguson] may be wise or unwise. But relief, if any be needed, lies not
with us but with the body constituted to pass laws for the state of Kansas." (quoting Day-
Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952))); see also Williamson v. Lee
Optical, 348 U.S. 483,488 (1955); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45,74 (1905) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
24. See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 60-61 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (noting that the Court defers to legislatures in interpreting Due Process, Contract, and
Takings Clauses).
25. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (basing application
of Takings Clause on diminution in property value).
26. See id. at 414 ("What makes the right to mine coal valuable is that it can be exer-
cised with profit."); 1 EDwARD CoKE, INsTrruTEs ch. 1, § 1 (1st Am ed. 1812) ("[FIor what
is the land but the profits thereof [?]" (quoted in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894 (1993))).
27. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (invalidating minimum
wage statute).
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in union activity, or, tellingly, sell goods or services at higher prices
than the challenged regulation permitted.29
C. Reconciling Post-Lochner Due Process and Regulatory Takings
Jurisprudence
The political and economic similarities between Lochner-era sub-
stantive due process review and regulatory takings analysis help ex-
plain the Court's reluctance to read the Takings Clause expansively.
However, at least two objections can be made to the analogy. First,
the Due Process Clause and the Takings Clause are theoretically dis-
tinct. Unlike the Due Process Clause, the Takings Clause does not
prevent government from regulating in particular ways or for particu-
lar purposes; it merely requires it to "pay its way" by compensating
affected property holders."0 There is thus no logical tension between
rejection of Lochner-era substantive due process review and regula-
tory takings scrutiny. Nevertheless, the likely real-world effect of re-
quiring compensation whenever regulation diminishes property values
would be substantially to mandate a laissez-faire economic system on
constitutional grounds. There is thus a practical tension between ra-
tional-basis review of economic regulation and an expansive regula-
tory takings doctrine.
Next, one might argue that even the practical tensions between
regulatory takings doctrine and minimal due process scrutiny are open
to question. After all, the Takings Clause is currently applied to some
categories of regulation, 1 yet there is no indication that government is
"hardly... go[ing] on."'3 2 As noted earlier, however, the Court has
28. See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (invalidating state law prohibiting
anti-union activity contracts); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (invalidating
federal law prohibiting anti-union "yellow dog" employment contracts).
29. See, ag., Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929) (gasoline prices); 71fson
& Bro.-United Theater Ticket Offices, Inc. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 429 (1927) (The "right
... to fix a price at which ... property shall be sold is an inherent attribute of the property
itself.").
30. The "public use" component of takings doctrine requires that exercises of eminent
domain be made for public, as opposed to private, purposes. But this requirement has
been interpreted as to place no substantial limitations on the purposes for which govern-
ment may effect a taking. See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Berman
v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); see also Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 (noting that "Fifth Amend-
ment is violated when land-use regulation 'does not substantially advance legitimate state
interests"' (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,260 (1980))); Thomas W. Mer-
rill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CoRNELm L. RFv. 61 (1986) (arguing that "public
use" component of Takings Clause mandates judicial scrutiny of whether eminent domain
is an appropriate means of achieving a legitimate governmental end).
31. See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
32. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
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intentionally confined regulatory takings to relatively narrow catego-
ries of property devaluations, presumably with the purpose of mini-
mizing judicial oversight of economic regulation. The Court cannot
significantly expand regulatory takings review without reviving the
Lochner problem.3 3 Health care reform legislation provides an apt
illustration of this reality. Given that there are some 600,000 physi-
cians34 and about 5,500 community hospitals35 in the United States,
requiring compensation of health care providers whose interests are
damaged by changing regulations (or, for that matter, merely requir-
ing individualized proceedings to determine whether such compensa-
tion were due) would, for practical purposes, amount to the
invalidation of health reform legislation.
As a practical matter, then, the Court will likely be unwilling to
find that a legislative program of the magnitude of comprehensive
health care reform results in a regulatory taking, even if price controls
create dramatic adverse effects on certain providers. The end of the
Lochner era has been generally understood to mean that the Constitu-
tion does not provide significant independent protection against the
infringement of economic liberties. The economic interests that
would be at stake in takings litigation based on health care price con-
trols are indistinguishable from those the Court formerly protected
under economic substantive due process analysis. Despite the fact
that substantive due process review and Takings Clause analysis rest
on different theoretical grounds, the practical result of requiring gov-
ernment to compensate parties affected by broad-based regulation
would be to limit legislative prerogatives in a drastic way.
H. Balancing Benefits and Burdens: Economic Effects of
Health Care Reform
A. Process Protection of Property Rights
The chief difficulty with the argument that the Court generally
ought not limit legislative prerogatives is that the Constitution, which
the Court is charged with enforcing, was designed with that precise
purpose (among others) in mind. A principal theme in the American
political tradition has been concern about the dark side of democ-
33. Nor can it limit takings review to price controls. There is no persuasive basis for
distinguishing between price and nonprice regulation in terms of economic effects. See
infra text accompanying note 147.
34. See HEALTH INSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, SOURCE BOOK OF HEALTH
INSURANCE DATA 81 (1991) (projection).
35. Id. (1989 figure).
racy-majoritarian exploitation of minorities.36 The Takings Clause,
with its focus on preventing property owners from being unfairly sin-
gled out to bear the costs of public programs, embodies a constitu-
tional concern about economic exploitation of individuals-one that
the courts, as protectors of individual rights, presumably ought to vin-
dicate even at some political cost.
An important answer 37 to this objection is that the legislative pro-
cess itself provides constitutionally adequate protection for the eco-
nomic interests of affected businesses. 38 Under current doctrine, a
36. See, e.g., THE FEDERALiST No. 10, at 80 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) ("When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular govern-
ment... enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the
rights of other citizens.").
37. Another response is that the Takings Clause, as a substantive matter, was never
intended to reach broad-based economic regulation. See Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the
Police Power, 74 YALE LJ. 36, 59-60 (1964) (suggesting that Takings Clause was intended
to serve as protection against "unfair or arbitrary government" rather than diminution in
value of property); id. at 55-57 (noting that idea of "just prices" was part of the common
law background against which the Takings Clause was adopted). But see Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886,2900 n.15 (1993) (rejecting originalist interpreta-
tion of Takings Clause if it would require "renounc[ing] the Court's contrary conclusion in
Mahon").
38. Footnote 4 of United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938),
is the textual starting point for theories of judicial review arguing that the political process
protects substantive rights. Without taking a position on the merits of a process-based
theory of judicial review, Justice Powell described it as follows:
The fundamental character of our government is democratic. Our Constitution
assumes that majorities should rule and that the government should be able to
govern. Therefore, for the most part, Congress and the state legislatures should
be allowed to do as they choose. But there are certain groups that cannot partici-
pate effectively in the political process. And the political process therefore can-
not be trusted to protect these groups in the way it protects most of us.
Consistent with these premises, the theory continues, the Supreme Court has two
special missions in our scheme of government:
First, to clear away impediments to participation, and ensure that all groups
can engage equally in the political process; and
Second, to review with heightened scrutiny legislation inimical to discrete
and insular minorities who are unable to protect themselves in the legislative
process.
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. Rlv. 1087, 1088-89 (1982).
Although the Court has come close to endorsing a process-based review theory, see, e.g.,
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), it has never "treat[ed] pure political interest bal-
ancing and log-rolling compromise as normatively acceptable." TRaBE, supra note 20, § 8-
7, at 582 (citing cases); see Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38
STAN. L. REv. 29, 50 (1985). Nevertheless, given the minimal standard of review to which
economic legislation is subjected, one may question whether, in fact, the Court does not
implicitly rely almost exclusively on the political process to protect individual property
rights. See Sunstein, supra, at 54-55 (noting argument that "prohibition against exercises of
raw power is merely rhetorical," but concluding that prohibition is instead an "'under-
enforced' constitutional norm[ ]"). But see Powell, supra, at 1091 (noting that process-
based vision relies on substantive vision in order to judge whether process is functioning
S~rine 19941 HEALTH CARE PRICE CONTROLS
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regulatory taking occurs when a property owner is "unfairly singled
out ...to bear a burden that should be borne by the public as a
whole. '3 9 A process-based theory 4° of constitutional protection posits
that minorities (other than those that are unlikely to have full access
to the political process) will have adequate means to protect them-
selves from exploitation by the majority.4'
smoothly); Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional
Theories, 89 YALE L. 1063 (1980).
It is, perhaps, especially difficult to justify a purely process-based theory of review
where the Takings Clause is concerned. Carolene Products footnote 4 itself began with the
observation that "[t]here may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of con-
stitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the
Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific
when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth." Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152-53
n.4. See also Tribe, supra, at 1065 (characterizing the Takings Clause as one of the Consti-
tution's "openly substantive commitments"). Despite this difficulty, it seems likely that the
scope courts give the Takings Clause will be influenced in part by their view of the ade-
quacy of process-based protections.
39. Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 1526 (1992) (citing Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-125 (1978)); see First English Evangelical Lu-
theran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,318-19 (1987) ("It is axiomatic that
the Fifth Amendment's just compensation provision is 'designed to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should
be borne by the public as a whole."' (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49
(1960))).
40. See Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 nA ("[P]rejudice against discrete and insu-
lar minorities may be a special condition ... curtail[ing] the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a corre-
spondingly more searching judicial inquiry.").
41. At least two justices would reject a process-based theory of the Takings Clause. In
Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988), Justice Scalia, joined by Justice O'Connor,
wrote in concurrence that the Takings Clause imposes limits on redistributive regulation of
any type. Focusing on the Court's formulation that the Takings Clause "'bar[s] Govern-
ment from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole,"' id. at 19 (Scalia, J. concurring) (quoting
Armstrong, 340 U.S. at 49), Justice Scalia wrote that economic regulation could not be used
to redistribute wealth where the affected parties were neither "the source [n]or the benefi-
ciary" of the social problem at which the regulation was aimed. Id. at 22 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring). The rent control ordinance in Pennell provided that, in addition to evaluating the
reasonableness of landlord rents in order to protect consumers against inordinately high
prices, the hearing officer was to consider whether the proposed rent increase would result
in hardship to the affected tenant. Justice Scalia argued that once the officer had reached a
conclusion that the rent to be charged was reasonable, the landlord could "no longer be
regarded as a 'cause' of exorbitantly priced housing; nor is he any longer reaping distinc-
tively high profits from the housing shortage." Id. at 21 (Scalia, J., concurring). Once
assurance is provided that the landlord is not charging an exorbitant price, the tenant's
hardship does not result from the landlord's practices, but from the tenant's poverty-a
"public welfare" problem the solution to which "has been the distribution ... of funds
raised from the public at large through taxes, either in cash (welfare payments) or in goods
(public housing, publicly subsidized housing, and food stamps)." Id.
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The process-based theory rests largely on a pluralist understand-
ing of legislative behavior. In the pluralist understanding, legislation
reflects not so much the will of any single "majority" as that of shifting
coalitions of minorities.42 Each minority is likely to have an intense
If adopted by the Court, Justice Scalia's "public welfare" test would significantly rein-
vigorate the constitutional protection of property interests threatened by economic regula-
tion. Justice Scalia takes pains to observe that nuisance and land-use regulation, and even
"emergency" price controls, would not be threatened under his proposed rule, since in
each of these cases there will usually be a connection between the evil at which the regula-
tion is aimed and the property restrictions involved. Id. at 20 (Scalia, J., concurring).
The "public welfare" test is subject to at least two objections, however. First, the
distinction between regulating property to prevent an evil and asking a property owner to
confer a benefit is notoriously problematic. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2897; Frank I.
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just
Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165, 1196-1201 (1967); Sax, supra note 37, at 48-
49. Next, the test implicitly relies on a judicial ability to distinguish the outer limits of the
"reasonableness" of price restrictions and other economic regulation. Consider the mini-
mum wage law for example. Under Scalia's test, the regulation would be valid only insofar
as it required employers, who presumably would have previously benefited from unreason-
ably low wages, to pay reasonable wages, perhaps defined as wages that provide a person
the means to support himself at some decent level. However, if a legislature set the mini-
mum wage at a level higher than the "reasonable" level, the wage would be viewed, in
effect, as a transfer payment from the employer to the employee for which the employer
would presumably be entitled to compensation from the public fisc.
Even under Scalia's "public welfare" test, health care price controls ought to pass
constitutional muster. A fundamental premise of current health care reform efforts is that
health care costs are too high. Health care prices have been artificially inflated by the
"moral hazard" associated with pervasive third party insurance, see CuARLns E. PHELPS,
HEALTH ECONOMICS 287-89 (1992), government tax policy, see id. at 298-303, and organ-
ized medicine's private regulation of the health care industry, see Mark A. Hall, Institu-
tional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to Health Care Cost Containment, 137
U. PA. L. RPv. 431, 533-34 (1988); see generally Clark C. Havighurst, The Changing Locus
of Decision Making in the Health Care Sector, 11 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 697 (1986).
Moreover, these same factors have contributed to increased output of health care goods
and services. Price controls designed to curb utilization (such as those associated with the
enforcement of premium caps in the Clinton plan) are not aimed merely at fixing a reason-
able price for a fixed quantity of medical care but at encouraging efficiency in health care
delivery by changing the inputs associated with medical services. See also Keystone Bitu-
minous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 487 n.16 (noting that government policy
judgments need not be unassailable in order to pass constitutional muster).
42. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison); THEODORE J. Lowr, THE END OF LIB-
ERALISM 51 (2d ed. 1979); Sunstein, supra note 38, at 32-35; Michael J. Waggoner, Log-
Rolling and Judicial Review, 52 U. CoLo. L. REv. 33, 35-37 (1980). But see Sunstein, supra
note 38, at 39 (arguing that Federalist No. 10 is not a "conventional pluralist document").
The Supreme Court does not find Takings Clause violations where challenged regula-
tion "arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life
to promote the common good." Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. It is not clear that the
Court was thinking in pluralist terms when these words were written; nevertheless, the
quoted phrase is suggestive of the give-and-take conception of the legislative process asso-
ciated with pluralism.
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interest in only a small proportion of proposed legislative actions.43 It
may thus trade votes on matters of minimal concern in exchange for
support for its own narrow agenda.44 Interest group theory suggests
that, far from being subject to domination by the "majority," powerful
interest groups may hold disproportionate influence in the legislative
process.45 If the interest group model of legislative behavior is ac-
cepted, there is no need to invoke the Takings Clause to protect mi-
nority property interests. Well-organized, highly interested groups
such as health care providers could be expected to protect their own
interests in the legislative process without the need for judicial
intervention.
46
43. Waggoner, supra note 42, at 35.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 36.
46. The pluralist model assumes that the political system is systematically biased in
favor of minorities. Professor Neil Komesar has identified four conditions that accompany
minoritarian bias in the legislature: "(1) the members of the minority each have much to
gain by the resolution of an issue in their favor, (2) the adverse effects on the majority are
spread thinly across a large population; (3) the issue is complicated and, therefore, (4)
information and organization costs are high." Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Public Utility Regula-
tory Takings: Should the Judiciary Attempt to Police the Political Institutions?, 77 GEo. L
2031, 2047 (1989) (summarizing Neil Komesar, A Job for the Judges: The Judiciary and the
Constitution in a Massive and Complex Society, 86 Mici. L. REv. 657, 671-75 (1988)). The
participation of health care providers in the debate over health care reform appears to fit
these conditions. Komesar, however, also posits the existence in certain cases, of
majoritarian legislative bias. Majoritarian bias may exist where "(1) the minority is dis-
crete, insular, and immutable; (2) the majority is politically active on the issue; and (3) the
stakes for the majority can be communicated in the form of simple symbols that facilitate
easy communication in the media and inexpensive exploitation by politicians." Pierce,
supra, at 2047 (summarizing Komesar, supra, at 675-83). Physicians and other health care
providers have, generally speaking, been remarkably successful in the legislative process,
see infra notes 50-54 and accompanying text, suggesting that the system has been biased, if
at all, to their net advantage. Given the increasing attention of the majority to health care
reform issues and the potential for politicians to scapegoat health care providers and
others in order to influence the debate, however, conditions could conceivably change so
as to create majoritarian bias against health care providers. Cf. Pierce, supra, at 2047-53
(describing shift from political environment favorable to public utilities to environment
suggestive of majoritarian bias against utilities).
At this writing, it appears that health care providers, while certainly not dictating the
outcome of the reform debate, continue to exercise influence well beyond their numbers.
For example, Dr. James Todd, Executive Vice President of the AMA recently reported
several important victories in the AMA lobbying related to the Clinton proposal:
We eliminated enterprise liability as a major proposal. Doctors will be allowed to
negotiate fee schedules. The benefits package Mrs. Clinton put together in 1993
looks a lot like the benefits package this house [AMA House of Delegates] put
together in 1989 .... And it's not a coincidence that fee-for-service medicine was
going to be restricted, and now it's a requirement. Or that a point-of-service op-
tion for HMOs was out of the president's plan, but now it's in .... And real
liability reform now appears in most of the congressional proposals.
B. Evaluating the Effects of Government Action
The interest group model of the political process is no doubt an
oversimplification.47 Nevertheless, it suggests important questions
about how the effects of government action upon affected groups
should be analyzed for Takings Clause purposes. As discussed above,
the pluralist model posits that, over time, interest groups can be ex-
pected to obtain favorable net results in the legislative process.48 The
pluralist vision thus suggests that government action's effects on spe-
cial interests should be evaluated in the aggregate, rather than enact-
ment by enactment. 49
Evaluating the aggregate economic effects of government action
in the health care sector requires two separate inquiries. First, the
adverse economic effects of legislation must be considered in light of
the effects generated by the enactments that precede and follow it.
For example, physicians have enjoyed considerable legislative success
over the years.50 Government subsidies through Medicare and Medi-
caid have added to demand for physician services, raising physician
Dr. Todd gives formula for winning reform game plan, AM. MED. NEws, Dec. 20, 1993, at
5. Even if majoritarian bias were present, it is unclear that judicial intervention would be
an effective solution to the problem. See Pierce, supra, at 2070-75 (suggesting that, in light
of judicial incompetence to supervise utility rate regulation, judicial forbearance would
lead in the long run to political solution of public utility problems).
47. Professors Farber and Frickey have criticized the interest group model of the legis-
lative process as incomplete: "Our best picture of the political process, then, is a mixed
model in which constituent interest, special interest groups, and ideology all help deter-
mine legislative conduct." DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRicKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC
CHoICE: A CRITICAL IMRODUCriON 33 (1991); see generally id. at 12-37 (surveying and
analyzing competing theories of legislative and interest group behavior). Farber and
Frickey conclude that because "diffuse groups will generally find it difficult to obtain [so-
cially beneficial] legislation that benefits them at the expense of more compact groups,"
the Takings Clause should not apply to legislation "where the beneficiaries are substan-
tially more diffuse than those regulated." Id. at 72.
48. The model need not be taken to suggest that interest groups win every legislative
battle they undertake. See DAVID B. TRUMAN, TiE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESs 508 (2d ed.
1971) (describing "total pattern of government" as "a protean complex of crisscrossing
relationships that change in strength and direction with alterations in the power and stand-
ing of interests, organized and unorganized").
49. Cf. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,124 (1978) ("A 'taking'
may more readily be found when the interference with property... [does not] arise[ ] from
some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the
common good."); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) ("average
reciprocity of advantage" recognized "as a justification of various laws"); see also Rose
supra note 15, at 583-85.
50. The text refers to physicians for convenience. Government policies concerning
hospital construction finance, Medicare, Medicaid, and private insurance have similarly
benefited hospitals and other institutional providers.
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incomes.51 Government tax policy has created incentives for workers
to take compensation in the form of health insurance coverage rather
than in cash, further decreasing the price sensitivity of consumers in
the health care marketplace.52 Medical education and research enjoy
heavy federal subsidies.53 States have protected physician interests
through licensure restrictions and laws prohibiting the corporate prac-
tice of medicine.54 Each of these has likely had a significant positive
effect on the "baseline" value of physician practices. Subsequent reg-
ulation that diminishes these values should be evaluated in that
context.
Next, both favorable and unfavorable features of health care re-
form legislation should be taken into account in determining its effects
on special interests.5 5 It is, of course, impossible to predict what the
nonprice regulatory features of health care reform legislation are
likely to be. Rather than consider all possible permutations, the dis-
cussion below roughly outlines the economic effects of both price and
nonprice regulation on health care providers based on the Clinton
health care reform plan56 and on the "single-payer" proposal of Rep-
resentative Jim McDermott (D-Wash.) and Senator Paul Wellstone
(D-Minn.). 7 Comparing the two plans will demonstrate the difficulty
of proving that government action has had an adverse net effect on
the interests of health care providers. Such proof is, of course, a pre-
requisite to a regulatory takings claim. Analysis of the Clinton and
McDermott-Wellstone proposals also serves as useful background for
Part III's evaluation of the status of health care price controls under
current regulatory takings doctrine.
51. Cf. PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 373
(1982) (noting increase in use of medical services brought about by Medicare and Medi-
caid); id. at 385-86 (describing Medicare's incentives for physicians to inflate prices).
52. GEORGE J. ANNAs ET AL., AmERicAN HEALTH LAW 138-39 (1990).
53. Id. at 710-11.
54. See generally Hall, supra note 41, at 507-18; Jeffrey F. Chase-Lubitz, Note, The
Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine: An Anachronism in the Modern Health Care In-
dustry, 40 VA. L. Rlv. 445 (1987).
55. Conceiving of legislation as a bargain among competing groups suggests that
courts should, on fairness grounds, be wary of interfering with legislative activity. Judicial
intervention on behalf of regulated parties permits interest groups first to "make their best
deal" in the legislative process and then to seek relief from its undesirable aspects in court.
56. See supra note 1.
57. The McDermott-Wellstone proposal is entitled "American Health Security Act of
1993." H.R. 1200, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S. 491, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [herein-
after AHSA] (unless otherwise noted, all citations are to the House version of the McDer-
mott-Wellstone proposal). Other major health reform proposals are not discussed here,
primarily because none of these alternative plans employs price controls.
1. Single-Payer Health Reform: The McDermott-Wellstone Proposal
As noted above, the legislation sponsored by Representative Mc-
Dermott and Senator Wellstone would reform American health care
under a single-payer model.5 8 Under the McDermott-Wellstone plan,
each state must establish an agency to serve as the state's sole third-
party payer for a governmentally defined comprehensive package of
health care benefits. 9 Physician and hospital prices would both be
regulated, although the price-setting mechanism employed in each
case would differ greatly. The proposal's likely net effects on the re-
spective economic interests of physicians and hospitals are considered,
in turn, below.
a. Effects on Physicians
Under the McDermott-Wellstone reform proposal, the state
would set fees for physician services following negotiations between
the state agency administering the plan and provider organizations."
The plan relies primarily on fee-for-service physician payment61 and
would permit patients free choice among physicians.62
Evaluating the net effects of the McDermott-Wellstone price con-
trols on physician practices is likely to be difficult. Physicians will not
respond passively to price regulation; instead, they could be expected
to respond by altering their practice styles. For physicians who con-
tinue to be paid on a fee-for-service basis, a likely response to dimin-
ished prices will be to increase the billable services, such as
58. See generally AHSA, supra note 57; Paul D. Wellstone & Ellen R. Shaffer, The
American Health Security Act: A Single-Payer Proposal, 328 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1489
(1993).
59. AHSA, supra note 57, §§ 201, 405.
60. Id. § 612.
61. Id. § 612(a)(1), (b). The McDermott-Wellstone plan contemplates, however, that
the American Health Security Standards Board "shall establish models and encourage
State health security programs to implement alternative payment methodologies that in-
corporate global fees for related services ... or for a basic group of services .... " Id.
§ 612(a)(2); see id. § 619 (permitting states to establish alternative payment methodologies
subject to stated conditions). The plan would also permit HMO-like "comprehensive
health service organizations" to operate, although consumers would have no financial in-
centive to enroll. Id. § 303. Payment to comprehensive health service organizations could
be made based on either capitation or on a global budget. Id. § 613. Subject to limitations
on utilization incentive payments, see id. § 303(c)(7), these organizations would be free to
make their own payment arrangements with participating physicians.
62. Patients who elected to enroll in comprehensive health services organizations
would presumably face limitations on their ability to select providers. However, patients
would not have financial incentives to enroll in such an organization. See Wellstone &
Shaffer, supra note 58, at 1490-91.
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procedures and tests, they order for each patient.63 Physicians may
also lower expenses associated with provision of services by reducing
inputs expended in connection with services regularly rendered to pa-
tients.' They may, for example, reduce office amenities, spend less
time with patients, or permit nurses or nurse practitioners to perform
services physicians might otherwise have personally performed.65
Of course, it is not clear just how far a physician may safely carry
such defensive measures. Decreasing inputs in connection with medi-
cal services is feasible as long as other physicians are also forced to do
so66 and as long as there are no legal barriers. But, for example, state
malpractice law or other licensing or quality-oriented regulation may
create legal risk if quality is diminished too far.67 Increasing output in
63. See PHELPS, supra note 41, at 216-17. But see Roger Feldman & Frank Sloan,
Competition Among Physicians, Revisited, 13 J. HEALTH POL, POL'Y & L. 239 (1988)
(summarizing economic research and questioning whether physicians can induce demand
for their services). The Senate version of the McDermott-Wellstone proposal would em-
ploy volume-performance standards to police such behavior by providers. See S. 491, supra
note 57, § 613(b)(2)(C); Wellstone & Shaffer, supra note 58, at 1490.
64. Feldman & Sloan, supra note 63, at 253-54 (noting that "regulatory agency has one
instrument-price-to hit two targets: optimal quantity and quality").
65. The Clinton plan specifically anticipates strategic provider responses to global
budget enforcement. Indeed, the purpose of the global budget, and of the premium cap
enforcement mechanism, is less to set a "fair" price for medical services as currently deliv-
ered, than to squeeze out "waste" in the system-that is, to change the way health care is
currently being delivered. For example, in response to cutbacks in provider payments oc-
casioned by enforcement of the premium cap, a physician might employ a nurse practi-
tioner to perform certain routine primary care functions. In doing so, the physician would
have responded predictably to price controls by substituting cheaper inputs for more ex-
pensive ones where possible. At the margin, it seems likely that at least some diminution
in the quality of care the patient receives would accompany such a change. A board-certi-
fied internist, for example, may well be able to make some difficult diagnoses that a com-
petent nurse practitioner might miss. Nevertheless, the input substitution could be
plausibly characterized as the elimination of "waste"-in the vast majority of cases it does
not make good economic sense to pay a highly trained internist to perform routine
functions.
66. If decreasing inputs would alter consumer demand, a physician that did so would
presumably lose patients to competitors who maintained input intensity despite price
regulation.
67. The McDermott-Wellstone proposal vests principal authority over quality stan-
dards in an "American Health Security Standards Board." See AHSA, supra note 57,
§ 401(f). There is no suggestion in the proposal that state laws governing licensure of
health care providers would be affected. For an argument that state malpractice laws can
accommodate change in the quality of care brought about by resource constraints, see
Mark A. Hall, Health Care Cost Containment and the Stratification of Malpractice Law, 30
JuRnairRxcs J. 501, 509 (1990) (arguing that "[flor the most part, treatment of the unin-
sured does not raise a malpractice issue"); Mark A. Hall, The Malpractice Standard under
Health Care Cost Containment, 17 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 347 (1989). But see E.
Haavi Morreim, Cost Containment and the Standard of Medical Care, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1719
(1987) (questioning flexibility of malpractice standards); E. Haavi Morreim, Stratified Scar-
response to price controls is also feasible only if it can be accom-
plished at negligible time and financial cost to the patient 6 8 and if it
can be done without generating legal risk from government programs
designed to police fraud and abuse.69 Obviously, it is possible that
prices could be set low enough that, notwithstanding available defen-
sive measures, providers will eventually withdraw from the regulated
market, either because they are unwilling to work for resulting low
wages or because they simply cannot afford to keep their doors
open.70
An evaluation of the effects of price controls should also take
into account the existing legal and economic environment. Even with-
out health reform legislation, physician fees are coming under increas-
ing pressure as managed care networks gain market share. Managed
care plans frequently force price concessions from physicians in ex-
change for the continued privilege of treating plan patients. Market
pressures suggest that the trend toward integrated, increasingly price-
conscious health care delivery will continue regardless of whether
comprehensive reform is enacted. Thus, it is not clear that physicians
could expect current fee levels to continue.
Even assuming the McDermott-Wellstone price controls, consid-
ered alone, would adversely affect physicians, other features of the
legislation appear to advance physician interests. Most strikingly, the
plan's promise of universal coverage will offset fee reductions to some
degree and permit physicians to increase services provided to pa-
tients.71 Similarly, if payment policies encourage primary care and
preventive services, opportunities for increasing output for all patients
(that is, not just those previously un- or under-insured) is enhanced.72
city: Redefining the Standard of Care, 17 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 356 (1989) (distin-
guishing between "standard of medical expertise" and "standard of resource use").
68. Again, assuming that patients would notice the strategies described in the text as
effective responses to price controls, their availability will depend in part upon whether
they are adopted by competitors. See supra note 66.
69. See AHSA, supra note 57, §§ 411-414 (fraud and abuse provisions); see generally
Pamela H. Bucy, Fraud by Fright: White Collar Crime by Health Care Providers, 67 N.C. L.
REv. 855 (1989).
70. But see Wellstone & Shaffer, supra note 58, at 1490 (stating that physician price
schedules under the McDermott-Wellstone proposal "would be designed to increase fees
for primary care, while probably slightly reducing fees for specialty care").
71. See AHSA, supra note 57, § 102(a) (creating universal entitlement).
72. The McDermott-Wellstone proposal's comprehensive benefits package makes gen-
erous provision for primary care and prevention services. Included in the package are
basic immunization, prenatal and well-baby care, well-child care, periodic screening for
breast, cervical, colon, and prostate cancer, physical examinations, family planning serv-
ices, routine eye examinations, eyeglasses, contact lenses, and hearing aids. Id. § 202(b)(2).
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Moreover, there are other, less obvious, benefits for physicians in
the McDermott-Wellstone proposal. The legislation preserves free
choice of physician, a feature of American health care that seems des-
tined to disappear or be greatly diminished. If current market trends
continue, progressively larger numbers of patients are likely to join
health care plans that deny or limit payment for services rendered by
out-of-plan physicians. These networks are able to offer consumers
lower prices by negotiating competitive fee schedules or capitation
rates with providers.73 Providers who refuse to accept low fees, or
those who are excluded from the network panel for other reasons,
may find themselves at a severe disadvantage in selling their services
to plan patients.74 The larger the market share of such plans in a
given community, the more serious the threat to physicians' practices.
Specialists, even those who are participating providers, face significant
loss of business if the plan requires that its members obtain a referral
from a primary care "gatekeeper" before it will pay for specialist serv-
ices.7 The free choice feature of the Wellstone-McDermott plan pre-
serves the centrality of the physician-patient relationship rather than
permitting the patient's choice of payer to limit the patient's choice of
physician. Presumably, some physicians who would have been losers
73. The ethical principle requiring that physicians deal only with plans that gave pa-
tients "free choice" among providers prevented price competition by requiring that "each
public or private health insurer must deal with all [physicians] as a guild, and could not
split them into competing groups." Charles D. Weller, "Free Choice" as a Restraint of
Trade in American Health Care Delivery and Insurance, 69 IowA L. REv. 1351, 1356
(1984). Not only do exclusive health plans facilitate price competition, they may also con-
tribute to a physician's loss of leverage in dealing with other institutions involved in health
care delivery, such as hospitals. Under a "free choice" system, physicians have a consider-
able say over the purchasing decisions of their patients. See PAUL STARR, TiE LOGmC OF
HEALTH CARE REFORM 26-27 (1992). Where patients' health care decisions become in-
creasingly focused on choice of health plan, the health plan, rather than the physician,
wields the economic power of the patients. See id., at 40-41 (describing managed care
plans as sometimes "personified ... by the M.B.A. with 10,000 patients in his briefcase who
expects, and gets, lower rates").
74. Predictably, in many states physicians have obtained legislation that protects their
"right" to participate in any health plan for which they are willing to meet the terms of
participation. State "Anti-Managed Care" Laws Threatened by Federal Reform Bills,
Health L. Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 78, 79 (Jan. 20, 1994) (15 states). Other states require
health plans to permit enrollees to choose fion-network providers. Id. (13 states).
75. See Uwe E. Reinhardt, Reorganizing the Financial Flows in American Health Care,
12 HEALTH Ars. 172,190 (Supp. 1993) (noting that "a substantial enrollment of Americans
in [managed care] systems could trigger a sizable physician surplus in the fee-for-service
sector"); see also Donald M. Steinwachs et al., A Comparison of the Requirements for Pri-
mary Care Physicians in HMOs with Projections Made by the GMENAC, 314 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 217 (1986).
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in a market-competitive battle for plan patients would retain a rela-
tively full patient load under the Wellstone-McDermott proposal.
Physician job satisfaction is also arguably enhanced by the fact
that physician influence over health care delivery is likely to be
greater under a single-payer proposal than if current trends con-
tinue.76 Administrative simplicity may lead to additional physician
satisfaction, as well as better bottom-line performance as physician
and affiliated personnel time can be spent on remunerative patient
care, rather than on unproductive administrative tasks.77
To summarize, evaluating the adverse effects of price regulation
on physicians is likely to be difficult. Physicians will respond to price
controls in the McDermott-Wellstone proposal by decreasing intensity
and increasing output, but there are limits beyond which such a strat-
egy is not likely to be effective. The adverse effects of price controls
may be offset by features of past legislation that favor physician inter-
ests. Moreover, some features of the McDermott-Wellstone plan,
such as universal coverage, the preservation of physician indepen-
dence from third party payers, reduction of administrative costs, and
malpractice reforms, would have meaningful favorable effects on the
value of physician practices.
b. Effects on Hospitals
Under the McDermott-Wellstone plan, each hospital negotiates a
global budget with the state "based on a nationally uniform system of
cost accounting established under standards of the [National Health]
Board." 78 The budget is established prospectively, and hospitals are
expected to remain within it while meeting their patients' needs.79
While the number of patients and the variety of their ailments are
among the many factors taken into account in developing the
76. Senator Wellstone and Representative McDermott have emphasized this virtue of
their plan in their communications with the medical community. See Wellstone & Shaffer,
supra note 58, at 1490 ("Should some practitioners receive somewhat lower fees, the trade-
off would be the autonomy to practice medicine without micromanagement by an insur-
ance company."); Janice Somerville, Singing the praises of single-payer: Doctor-congress-
man says this model offers the most effective route to reform, Am. MED. NEws, Dec. 6, 1993,
at 9 (describing McDermott's efforts to persuade fellow physicians to support single-payer
health reform).
77. See GAO Report to the Chairman, House Committee on Government Operations,
Canadian Health Insurance: Lessons for the United States, GAO/HRD-91-90, June 4, 1991,
at 29-33 [hereinafter GAO Report]; see also Steffie Woolhandler & David U. Himmelstein,
The Deteriorating Administrative Efficiency of the U.S. Health Care System, 324 NEw ENG.
1. MED. 1253 (1991) (discussing administrative simplicity of Canadian model).
78. AHSA, supra note 57, § 611(b).,
79. Id. § 611(a).
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budget,80 hospitals would receive no guaranteed reimbursement per
service, patient day, or diagnosis.8
Once the global budget is established, the hospital can protect
itself financially only by reducing the intensity with which services are
provided; it can obtain no additional payment by providing more serv-
ices. Hospitals are thus likely to reduce amenities, eliminate excess
capacity, delay investment in new technologies, hire relatively fewer
skilled workers, discourage admissions, and discharge high-cost pa-
tients "quicker and sicker."82 As is the case with physician providers,
however, state malpractice law and other quality-oriented regulation
may limit the degree to which costs may be reduced. Once again, the
aggregate economic effects of the price controls on the value of the
hospital's business are difficult to isolate.
Like physicians, hospitals also stand to benefit from favorable
features of the McDermott-Wellstone reform legislation. Perhaps
most importantly, hospitals have traditionally financed uncompen-
80. See id. § 611(b)(2).
81. Hospitals would, however, be obligated to submit discharge information classified
by diagnosis-related group. Id. § 611(b)(3).
82. See PHELPS, supra note 41, at 479. Although Phelps uses the "quicker and sicker"
catch phrase in reference to hospitals squeezed by Medicare's prospective payment system,
hospitals could be expected to adopt a similar strategy in response to a global budget, at
least with respect to above-average-cost patients. In fact, perhaps the best-known Cana-
dian-hospital strategic response to global budget reimbursement is the retention of patients
known as "bed-blockers." GAO Report, supra note 77, at 45. Canadian hospitals have
economic incentives to fill beds, where possible, with long-term patients for whom the cost
of treatment is below-average. Id. Such patients, estimated to occupy 15% of available
Canadian hospital beds at any one time, may be admitted for upwards of 60 days per stay,
and their presence "preventis] physicians from using acute care beds to treat [higher cost]
short-term patients." Id. The Canadian hospital also encourages hospitals to reduce ser-
vice intensity by using "less labor, supplies, procedures and equipment." Id. at 47. Specifi-
cally, those "hospitals use fewer nurses, drugs, operating rooms[, and] MRI. Id.; see
Robert G. Evans et al., Controlling Health Care Expenditures-The Canadian Reality, 320
NEw ENG. J. MED. 571, 573-74 (1989). Similarly, access to technology is tightly controlled.
GAO Report, supra note 77, at 48-51; see Geoffrey M. Anderson et al., Hospital Care for
Elderly Patients With Diseases of the Circulatory System: A Comparison of Hospital Use in
the United States and Canada, 321 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1443, 1446-47 (1989) (noting that
Canadians receive, on average, fewer high-tech treatments such as coronary artery bypass
surgery, valvular surgery, although more major reconstructive surgery and permanent
pacemakers); John K. Iglehart, Canada's Health Care System Faces its Problems, 322 NEW
ENG. 3. MED. 562, 565 (1990) (noting that "Canada has appreciably slowed the diffusion of
six major forms of technology: open-heart surgery, cardiac catheterization, organ trans-
plantation, radiation therapy, extracorporeal shock-wave lithotripsy and magnetic
resonance imaging); see generally Allan S. Detsky et al., The Effectiveness of a Regulatory
Strategy in Containing Hospital Costs: the Ontario Experience, 1967-1981, 309 NEw ENG. 3.
MED. 151 (1983); Allan S. Detsky et al., Global Budgeting and the Teaching Hospital in
Ontario, 24 MED. CAPE 89 (1986).
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sated care by increasing charges to private patients. As payors and
employers have become more cost-sensitive, however, cost-shifting
has become problematic.8 3 A global budget would, in theory at least,
reward hospitals for treatment of all patients without discrimination,
rationalize the payment process, and reduce hospital administrative
costs.84 Accordingly, price controls resulting in decreased per-diagno-
sis or per-fee payments (as compared to rates formerly in effect for
privately insured patients) would not necessarily result in significant
net decreases in hospital revenues.8 5
Continuation of free choice of provider may also benefit hospitals
in that hospital management might prefer to market the hospital's
services by seeking physician referrals instead of negotiating with
health plans, for whom price is likely to be a predominant considera-
tion.86 Moreover, incumbent institutional providers would presuma-
bly welcome continuation or reinvigoration of health planning
regulatory mechanisms that prevent market entry by would-be com-
petitors.87 As is the case with physicians, however, the hospital
budget could theoretically be set at a rate low enough that the hospital
could not reasonably be expected to meet its obligations. Under the
McDermott-Wellstone proposal, however, there appears to be a basis
for challenging a budget that is unreasonably low because states are
statutorily obligated to take into account a set of cost-based factors.
88
Again, the task of determining the precise adverse effects is likely to
be difficult.
2. Competition Under a Global Budget: The Clinton Plan
The Clinton health care reform proposal relies on a mix of com-
petition and regulation in order to control health care costs.89 Under
the plan, the nation would be divided into regions, each of which
83. See Havighurst, supra note 41, at 727.
84. See GAO Report, supra note 77, at 32-33; Woolhandler & Himmelstein, supra note
77, at 1256-57.
85. In addition, the McDermott-Welistone plan expressly contemplates continued
charitable giving to private hospitals, although states are not obligated to provide ongoing
budgetary support to operate donated equipment. AHSA, supra note 57, § 611(d).
86. See supra note 73.
87. See AHSA, supra note 57, § 405(a)(3); see also Clark C. Havighurst, Regulation of
Health Facilities and Services by "Certificate of Need," 59 VA. L. REv. 1143, 1185-87 (1973)
(noting that "Certificate of Need" programs tend to favor incumbent providers).
88. See AHSA, supra note 57, § 611(b)(2); see also id. §632 (appeals procedures).
89. THE WHITE Housa DormssIc POLICY COUNCIL, THE PREs EN'S H ALTH SE-
cui-ry PLAN 102 (1993).
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would be served by a health alliance." Health alliances are clearing-
houses for the marketing of accountable health plans to consumers.91
Consumers within each alliance would choose among differently
priced health plans offering standard packages of comprehensive
health benefits.9 2 Plans would compete on the basis of both the cost
and quality of their overall services.93 Most plans would contain costs
in part by using primary care physicians as gatekeepers to specialists'
services and by negotiating favorable financial and utilization arrange-
ments with limited provider panels.9 4 Alliances would, however, be
required to offer at least one plan permitting consumers free choice of
their physician.95
Although competition among plans is expected to help keep
health care costs low, the Clinton plan imposes a global limitation on
health care costs in order to ensure that cost-containment goals are
met.96 Under the plan, a National Health Board would establish a
national budget for health care expenditures based on prior expendi-
tures adjusted for inflation and other factors, as well as regional budg-
ets for each alliance. 1 These regional budgets are enforced by
premium caps, that is, price controls on the premiums health plans
may charge to plan members. In the event the weighted average of
health plan premiums exceeds the regional target, each health plan is
assessed a proportional sum designed to bring the weighted premium
average across all plans back in line with the budget.98 Health plans
90. HSA, supra note 1, § 1202. Large employers may elect to form a corporate alli-
ance for their employees, rather than pay for employees' health care through the regional
alliance. Id. § 1311.
91. See id. §§ 1321-1325.
92. See Paul Starr & Walter A. Zelman, Bridge to Compromise: Competition under a
Budget, 12 HEALTH AnF. 7, 9-12 (Supp. 1993).
93. The Clinton plan borrows its emphasis on encouraging consumers to make cost-
conscious choices among health plans from the managed competition framework devel-
oped by Alain Enthoven. The framework for choice among health plans that Enthoven
envisioned, and which the Clinton plan follows to a significant extent, is summarized in
Alain C. Enthoven, The Principles of Managed Competition, 12 HEALT AiF. 24, 29-35
(Supp. 1993).
94. These characteristics are implicit in the Clinton plan's reliance on managed care.
See STARR, supra note 73, at 11; John K. Iglehart, Health Policy Report: The American
Health Care System: Managed Care, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 742 (1992) (describing man-
aged care).
95. HSA, supra note 1, § 1322.
96. THE WHITE HousE DoMEmSTc POLICY CoUicn., supra note 89, at 102; Starr &
Zelman, supra note 92, at 18-21.
97. HSA, supra note 1, §§ 6001-6004. The setting of these budgets is immune from
administrative or judicial review. Id. § 5232.
98. Id. § 6011.
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are required to "pass through" the premium assessment to their prov-
iders by proportionally reducing payments to them.99 In effect, then,
provider fees are capped at the previously negotiated rate less this
proportional reduction.
a. Effects on Physicians
Price controls affecting physician services under the Clinton plan
would take two forms. Physician payment through the fee-for-service
plan offered in each alliance would be based on a physician fee sched-
ule negotiated between the alliance and providers within the region.1°°
The fee-for-service plan would permit "any lawful health care pro-
vider"'10 1 to offer services to individuals within the alliance. Physicians
seeing patients enrolled in closed or limited panel plans, on the other
hand, would be paid in accordance with the contracts they negotiated
with the plans and not according to the fee schedule.
For the most part, physician responses to price controls under the
Clinton plan should not vary according to whether the adverse effects
on physician income are attributable to the fixed fee-for-service
schedule or to implementation of the premium cap. As would be the
case under the McDermott-Wellstone single-payer system, physicians
could be expected to attempt to mitigate adverse effects of price con-
trois by decreasing the intensity of inputs in services already being
provided or by increasing output."°2 Providers who are practicing pri-
marily in a fee-for-service plan retain the additional option, however,
of responding to decreases in the regional alliance's fixed fee schedule
by affiliating with managed-care plans.
The Clinton plan also would encourage existing market trends to-
ward reduced physician influence within the health care system. The
substantial control over health care delivery that physicians have tra-
ditionally enjoyed has resulted in substantial part from their discretion
in determining from whom their patients would purchase secondary
services (such as hospital or diagnostic services). The Clinton plan
99. See id. § 6012.
100. Id. § 1322(c). Since the Act expressly precludes a physician boycott, id.
§1322(b)(2)(B), it is difficult to understand exactly what leverage providers will bring to
the negotiating table. Presumably, providers will have some incentive to keep physician
fees they demand at reasonable levels, as the fee schedule will affect the relative cost of the
fee-for-service plan.
101. Id. § 1322(b)(2)(A)(i).
102. See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text. Fee-for-service payments under the
"free choice" plan are subject to prospective budgeting, thus limiting the aggregate (but
not necessarily the individual) ability of physicians to compensate for price controls by
enhancing output. See HSA, supra note 1, § 1322(d).
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establishes a health care purchasing framework that will encourage
consumers to focus health care purchasing decisions primarily on
choice of health plan rather than choice of provider. One would ex-
pect this change to result in a substantial decline in physician power.
Physicians will no longer be guaranteed the opportunity to attempt to
sell their services to all of the patients in a given market. Instead,
some physicians will find much of the available patient market fore-
closed unless they accede to health plan demands concerning price,
utilization, and other matters, which traditionally have been within the
physician's prerogative. They may also find their ability to extract
concessions from hospitals and other institutional providers compro-
mised as institutions become more concerned with satisfying the payer
than the treating physician. Specialists may find themselves in partic-
ularly difficult circumstances. Even if the specialist is willing to ac-
cede to plan demands concerning price and utilization, plan members
are still likely to be required to obtain the approval of a primary care
physician before a visit to a specialist will be covered. Managed care
plans may discourage patient self-referral to specialists, significantly
damaging some physicians' practices. However, physicians will not be
completely at plans' mercy. One issue that will presumably be impor-
tant to consumers selecting health plans is the perceived competence
of the provider panel and the degree of choice among specialists the
patient could expect in the event of foreseen or unforeseen illness."0 3
The adverse effects of the Clinton plan price controls on the
value of physician practices will also be mitigated by those features of
the reform package that are favorable to physicians. As was the case
with the McDermott-Weilstone single-payer plan, universal coverage,
considered by itself, enhances the value of physician practices by re-
ducing the amount of bad debt physicians experience. 10 4 The Clinton
103. Preservation of the fee-for-service option may enable physicians in certain areas to
preserve significant autonomy. For example, since the fee-for-service option is expected to
be the most expensive (and will probably, at least initially, be perceived as of higher qual-
ity), it seems likely that wealthier areas would contain relatively more patients selecting
this option. To the extent hospitals and other area providers cater to these patients, physi-
cians will continue to be able to threaten to "take their patients elsewhere" if hospital
management refuses to accede to their demands.
The problem of foreseeable illness suggests one of the apparent design flaws in the
Clinton plan. If each plan must hold open enrollment each year, see HSA, supra note 1,
§ 1323(d)(1), many patients may choose a cheaper plan on the theory that they are better
off waiting to join a more expensive, high quality plan until they get sick. Such consumers
would bear the risk only that they would be adversely affected by lower quality health care
in the event they required significant treatment before the next open enrollment period.
104. It will also enhance the ability of some physicians, most notably those practicing
primary care, to respond to price controls by enhancing output. But see id. § 6012(a)(2)(B)
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plan also includes malpractice reforms and administrative cost reduc-
tion measures that might enhance the value of physician practices by
reducing expenses associated with potential malpractice liability and
the insurance claims process.10 5
b. Effects on Hospitals
The Clinton plan imposes indirect price controls on hospitals. As
described more fully above,"0 6 health plan premium payments are lim-
ited to levels that will permit regional budgets for health care spend-
ing to be met. The health care plans are required to pass along the
required premium cuts to providers, including hospitals, by reducing
payments otherwise due. Hospitals' ability to counteract the effects of
the passthrough of the Clinton premium cuts will vary depending on
the payment and utilization arrangements among the hospital, the
health plan, and the plan's physicians. If a hospital were paid on a
capitate basis, its response to diminished payment revenues would re-
semble that predicted under the McDermott-Wellstone plan.0 7 The
hospital could avoid adverse economic effects only by reducing the
intensity with which it provided services; it could not increase reve-
nues by providing additional services. One would thus expect to find
hospitals reducing amenities, eliminating excess capacity, delaying or
eliminating investment in new technologies, discouraging admissions,
and discharging patients sooner. 08 Hospitals paid in a different man-
ner might have other strategic responses available. The adverse ef-
fects of the Clinton price controls will, like those under McDermott-
Wellstone, be offset by reform provisions favorable to hospitals,
chiefly universal coverage and provisions reducing hospital adminis-
trative costs and malpractice expenses.10 9
The foregoing discussion of the likely effects of the Clinton and
McDermott-Wellstone health reform plans on providers raises a
(providing for increase in provider-payment reductions "to take into account any esti-
mated increase in volume of services provided that may reasonably be anticipated as a
consequence of... a reduction in [provider payments pursuant to the premium cap]").
105. See id. §§ 5301-5306 (providing for alternative dispute resolution, certificate of
merit as prerequisite for bringing medical malpractice cases, limitations on contingent at-
torneys' fees, reduction of awards based on recovery from collateral sources and periodic
payment of damage awards); id. §§ 5101-5106 (proposals designed to increase administra-
tive efficiency).
106. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
107. This is so because the sum of the capitation payments a hospital will receive for the
population it must serve amounts to a "global budget" for the institution.
108. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
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number of -difficult questions for potential regulatory takings plain-
tiffs. Since Justice Holmes' opinion in Mahon, the starting point for a
regulatory takings claim has been a demonstration that the challenged
regulation has diminished the value of the claimant's property. As
shown above, however, health care providers could be expected to
engage in defensive responses to price controls. These responses may
greatly complicate the task of isolating the adverse economic effects
caused by price controls. Moreover, inquiry into the diminution in
property values effected by a given piece of reform legislation should
not be limited to the isolated effects of price regulation. If the adverse
effect of government action on property value is to be accurately
gauged, the net economic effect of the entire legislative package must
be assessed. In fact, as argued above, there is no apparent justification
for limiting judicial scrutiny even to a single piece of legislation. Even
if reform legislation were to result in a dramatic diminution in the
value of health care providers' property, a strong case could likely be
made that the net effect of government action (including health re-
form legislation) over the past several decades has been to enrich
health care providers. As noted, government has erected trade barri-
ers that have benefited providers, injected significant funding into the
health care sector and generally encouraged a spare-no-expense style
of health care delivery that has inured to providers' direct and indirect
advantage. 110 In order to show that government policy resulted in a
diminution of provider property values, a takings claimant must either
demonstrate that government action, taken as a whole, has had a net
adverse economic effect or explain why providers are constitutionally
entitled to the continuance of market conditions resulting from health
care policies the government presumably had no obligation to adopt
in the first place.
The analysis suggested above is, of course, virtually impossible to
employ as a practical matter. Courts are ill-equipped to consider the
net effects of a single provider's defensive maneuvers in response to
price controls, much less to evaluate the cumulative effect of all mod-
em legislation affecting health care providers' property values.
Although the existence of "diminution in value" is the starting point
for a regulatory takings claim, a court will likely never need to reach
the issue. As the discussion in Part III demonstrates, the balancing
test applicable to regulatory takings claims suggests strongly that
health care price controls will not constitute a taking, regardless of the
severity of any associated diminution in value.
110. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
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III. Regulatory Takings Doctrine: Ad Hoc Balancing
Determining the extent of any "diminution in value" in a claim-
ant's property is only the beginning of the regulatory takings inquiry.
Even where government regulation severely diminishes property val-
ues, compensation is not necessarily due under the Takings Clause."'
Once a diminution in value has been shown, the central inquiry be-
comes whether the challenged regulation forces the claimant "to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole. 1" 2 Implicit in the question whether it is "fair"
or "just" to ask an individual to bear a "public" burden is a presump-
tion that in some cases individuals may, in justice and fairness, be
called upon to do just that.
Except in the case of government actions that fall into per se tak-
ings categories," 3 the Court relies on ad hoc balancing of interests to
decide when fairness requires that a property owner be compensated.
The factors considered include: (1) the nature of the government ac-
tion, (2) the severity of the economic impact; and (3) the degree of
interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations." 4 The
discussion below considers their likely application in the event health
care price controls are enacted and challenged.
A. Nature of the Government Action
Under the balancing test employed by the Court, the first issue is
whether the challenged government action amounts to a "physical in-
vasion" of real property or whether it is a "public program adjusting
the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common
good."'1 5 Generally speaking, regulations in the former category obli-
111. "[A] reduction in the value of the property is not necessarily equated with a tak-
ing." Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979); see also Concrete Pipe & Prods., Inc. v.
Construction Laborers Pension Tust, 113 S. Ct. 2264, 2291 (1993) (diminution in property
value, without more, insufficient to support takings claim); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886,2910 (1993) (same); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104, 131 (1978) (same). The Court has held that no taking existed in the face of quite
extraordinary diminutions in value. See, e.g., Andrus, 444 U.S. at 51 (prohibiting sale of
lawfully acquired eagle feathers); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (property owners
ordered to cut down trees); Hadacheck v. Sebastian 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (brickyard clo-
sure); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (brewery business destroyed by prohibition
statute). Measuring diminution in value is problematic because the proportion of the dimi-
nution depends upon how the property interests at issue are identified. See Rose, supra
note 15, at 566-69.
112. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
114. Concrete Pipe, 113 S. Ct. at 2290-92.
115. Penn Central, 348 U.S. at 124.
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gate the government to pay compensation;116 regulations in the latter
category do not.1 7 Clearly, health care reform legislation falls into
the latter category.
The nature of the government regulation at issue is likely to be
decisive in regulatory takings cases for reasons that are primarily prac-
tical in nature. As discussed in Part I, the Court reviews business reg-
ulation deferentially, in part because of its implicit assumption that
property owners can protect themselves in the legislative process.""
As argued above, an expansive regulatory takings doctrine is practi-
116. Although a regulation that effects a permanent physical invasion of property or
results in a complete diminution in value of land now constitutes a per se taking, see Lucas,
112 S. Ct. at 2893, neither one of those conditions would have been dispositive of the
takings inquiry under early formulations of the balancing test. See, e.g., Penn Central, 438
U.S. at 124 ("A 'taking' may more readily be found when the interference with property
can be characterized as a physical invasion by the government than when interference
arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to
promote the common good." (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). Even where the gov-
ernment regulation does not amount to a per se taking, the Court is influenced in its appli-
cation of the balancing test by the degree to which governmental action resembles an
invasion or physical appropriation of property. See, e.g., Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704,716-
17 (1987) (complete abolition of descent and devise of property may constitute a violation
of the Takings Clause); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 163-
64 (1980) (state law making interest from interpleaded funds court property violated Tak-
ings Clause).
117. While the Court has been willing to say categorically that certain types of regula-
tory intrusions constitute takings, see supra text accompanying notes 16-17, it has been
unwilling to announce categories of regulation that do not amount to takings, as Frank
Michelman predicted it might do in 1988:
[T]he Court is finding its open-ended balancing posture hard to maintain and so is
moving noticeably towards a reformalization of regulatory-takings doctrine. Doc-
trine appears to be moving in the direction of resolution into a series of categori-
cal "either-ors:" either (a) the regulation is categorically a taking of property
because (i) it works a permanent physical occupation (however practically trivial)
of private property by the government ... or (ii) it totally eliminates the prop-
erty's economic value or "viability" to its nominal owner, or (b) the regulation is
categorically not a taking.
Michelman, supra note 19, at 1622. Lucas appeared to confirm Professor Michelman's
prediction, at least with respect to part (a) of his formulation. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893
(finding that regulations described in (a)(i) and (ii) above are, indeed, per se takings); see
also id. at 2899 (owner of personal property "ought to be aware of the possibility that new
regulation might even render his property economically worthless" (citing Andrus v. Al-
lard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979))). Nevertheless, the balancing test reappeared in its traditional
form in Concrete Pipe & Prods., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 113 S. Ct.
2264, 2290-92 (1993).
118. See supra Part II.A.; see also Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 (noting the Court's "usual
assumption that the legislature is simply 'adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic
life' in a manner that secures an 'average reciprocity of advantage' to everyone concerned"
(quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415
(1922))). The fact that isolating the net effects of broad government programs is likely to
be difficult may also have encouraged judicial deference. See supra Part U.B.
cally inconsistent with the proposition that the legislature, and not the
judiciary, should be the primary judge of the wisdom and fairness of
economic regulation. 1 9 Accordingly, the Court is sensitive to the
need for consistency in the level of protection it gives economic inter-
ests in Takings Clause, Due Process Clause, and other constitutional
jurisprudence. 120 The inquiry into the government interest at stake in
the challenged regulation is the Court's primary vehicle for maintain-
ing that consistency.
Moreover, compensating all citizens for economic losses they in-
cur as a result of broad-based regulation would create insurmountable
administrative burdens.' 2' Consider, for example, the costs of permit-
ting individual physicians to make public-utility-style challenges to the
adequacy of fees set pursuant to government regulation. Evaluating
the reasonableness of government-set prices as applied to individual
providers would require a small army of lawyers, economists, and
medical consultants even if only a significant minority of physicians
were to challenge fee schedules mandated by the government. 22
And, of course, an interpretation of the Takings Clause that required
individual hearings on the adverse effects of health care price regula-
tion could not be easily limited to either price regulation or the health
care sector.123 Armed with an expanded interpretation of the Takings
Clause, other businesses facing costs imposed by government regula-
119. See supra Part I.C.
120. See Allied Structural Steel v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 260 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("Decisions over the past 50 years have developed a coherent, unified interpre-
tation of all the constitutional provisions that may protect economic expectations and these
decisions have recognized a broad latitude in States to effect even severe interference with
existing economic values when reasonably necessary to promote the general welfare.");
United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 33 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
121. Cf Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503,517 (1944) (noting that "considerations of
feasibility and practicality are certainly germane" to constitutional question whether indi-
vidualized ratemaking was required).
122. See AMA Memorandum, supra note 5, at 21 (suggesting features of price adjust-
ment mechanism for individual physicians); see also supra Part II.B (explaining difficulties
of determining net effects of government action).
123. See infra note 147 and accompanying text (criticizing distinction between price and
other regulation). This appears to be the fundamental flaw in the "specific capital" theory
proposed by Professor Merrill. The theory gives a helpful account of why some types of
price regulation are likely to be more damaging than others. See Thomas W. Merrill, Con-
stitutional Limits on Physician Price Controls, 21 HASTINGS CONSr. L.Q. 635, 640-41
(1994). Nevertheless, it does not explain why the Takings Clause requires compensation
when price regulation results in significant diminution in value of specific capital but does
not require compensation where the diminution in value of specific capital results from
nonprice regulation. Cf. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (avian artifacts); Goldblatt v.
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (quarry); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915)
(brickyard); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (brewery).
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tion could be expected to argue that cost increases associated with
regulatory compliance effectively deprive them of the opportunity to
earn a reasonable return on their investments. From a purely admin-
istrative perspective, the wisdom of avoiding Takings Clause review of
broad-based economic regulation is manifest.
B. Severity of Economic Impact
The second factor in the regulatory takings balancing test is the
"economic impact of the regulation on the claimant."' 24 The Court
does not rely heavily on this part of the balancing analysis in deciding
cases. Regulations resulting in a complete diminution in value of land
are, of course, per se takings."2 Anything short of a complete taking,
however, is not likely to impress the Court absent other factors. Thus,
severe diminutions in value short of "total" takings have been toler-
ated on a relatively frequent basis. 26 Indeed, while a threshold show-
ing of some degree of diminution in property value presumably must
be made in order to sustain a regulatory takings claim, any showing
short of a complete diminution in value is unlikely, by itself to make a
difference in the ultimate resolution of the case.' 27
C. Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations
The third factor in the regulatory takings balancing test considers
the "reasonable investment-backed expectations" of the claimant in
the devalued property. This factor focuses on both the type of prop-
erty interest involved and on whether the claimant should reasonably
have expected the damaging governmental intervention. 28 The for-
124. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
125. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1993).
126. See Concrete Pipe & Prods., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 113 S.
Ct. 2264, 2291 (1993) (characterizing regulation at issue in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365,384 (1926), as effecting a 75% diminution in value of the claimant's property;,
and Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394,405 (1915), as effecting a 92.5% diminution); see
also Andrus, 444 U.S. at 66 (no taking resulted from prohibition of sale of eagle feathers
where claimants "retain[ed] the rights to possess and transport their property, and to do-
nate or to devise the protected birds").
127. See supra note 111.
128. The "reasonable investment-backed expectations" formulation first appeared in
Penn Central. 438 U.S. at 127 (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922),
"for the proposition that a state statute ... may ... frustrate distinct, investment-backed
expectations" (emphasis added)). The Court likely borrowed the phrase from Michelman's
article on just compensation. Michelman, supra note 41, at 1233 (diminution in value test
asks "whether or not the measure in question can easily be seen to have practically de-
prived the claimant of some distinctly perceived, sharply crystallized, investment-backed ex-
pectation" (emphasis added)). It is most unlikely that Michelman intended the phrase to
be a launching point for a formalistic inquiry into the "type" of property interest involved.
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mer inquiry invites a theoretical formulation of what constitutes
"property" for Takings Clause purposes. The Court's decisions can be
read to create a hierarchy of protected property interests, beginning
with land,12 9 followed (in descending order of protection) by personal
property, contract rights, and noncontractual expectations of future
profits. 3 °
As suggested in Part I's comparison of the economic interests
protected under regulatory takings doctrine and those protected
under the discredited Lochner "liberty of contract" analysis, regula-
tory takings claims always involve regulatory reduction of the reve-
nues expected from the exploitation of an asset.'3 ' The economic
damage suffered by the claimant would not seem to depend in any
important way on whether the underlying asset is real property, equip-
ment, a contract, or the goodwill or know-how of a particular busi-
ness. Therefore, it is hard to make economic sense of employing
categories of property interests to distinguish between takings claims.
The more important aspect of the "reasonable investment-backed
expectations" inquiry has to do with whether a regulatory takings
claimant should have expected that subsequent regulation might di-
minish the value of his property. 32 In any investment, one of the rele-
vant business risks is that government action might affect market
conditions. If the claimant should reasonably have foreseen such gov-
ernment action, the case for compensation is weakened. Not surpris-
ingly, this dimension of the "reasonable expectations" inquiry is
frequently decisive in cases where the takings plaintiff is doing busi-
ness in a regulated industry. 3 In those cases, the doctrine imposes
the risk of additional intervention squarely upon the regulated
business.
See id. at 1203 n.79 (criticizing Sax's "definitional" approach to identifying protected inter-
ests under the Takings Clause); Sax, supra note 41, at 61-64 (defining "property" as "the
end result of a process of competition among inconsistent and contending economic
values").
129. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893 (per se protection against physical invasions of land
and complete diminution in value of land).
130. See infra text accompanying notes 134-39.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 25-29.
132. See, e.g., Concrete Pipe & Prods., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 113
S. Ct. 2264,2291 (1993); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211,227 (1986);
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Gray, 467 U.S. 717, 721 (1984); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn
Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1976).
133. See Concrete Pipe, 113 S. Ct. at 2291 (quoting Federal Hous. Auth. v. The Darling-
ton, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 91 (1958) ("Those who do business in the regulated field cannot
object if the legislative scheme is buttressed by subsequent amendments to achieve the
legislative end.")).
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As it turns out, however, even the inquiry into the reasonableness
of a claimant's perceptions about the risk of additional regulation is
not entirely divorced from considerations about the type of property
interest at stake. For example, the Court has stated that a regulation
eliminating all economic value of personal property is not a per se
taking: "by reason of the State's traditionally high degree of control
over commercial dealings, [the owner] ought to be aware of the possi-
bility that new regulation might even render his property economi-
cally worthless."'1 34  Contract rights are also deemed especially
susceptible to state regulation. While "[c]ontracts may create rights of
property,"135 "when contracts deal with a subject matter which lies
within the control of Congress, they have a congenital infirmity.' '136
The difficulty with this argument, of course, is that the Court might
have said the same thing of land use regulation-namely, that while
land is certainly "property," reliance on specific land uses suffers from
the "congenital infirmity" of the land-use regulation that state legisla-
tures and the Congress may impose. Judicial definition of what expec-
tations are reasonable is often circular; the reasonableness of any
given expectation rises or declines with the Court's decisions. 37
Noncontractual expectations of future gain in the marketplace
are entitled to the lowest level of constitutional protection. 38 In the
health care marketplace, those expectations would include expected
revenues from the sale of medical or hospitalization services, among
others. These expectancies of future profits do not rest on existing
contracts; patients will not yet have engaged physicians to treat spe-
cific diseases; health plans and providers may not yet have entered
into provider agreements extending past the effective date of pending
legislation; insurance policies may not yet have been sold. Even so,
part of the business value of affected medical practices, payers, and
institutional providers consists of estimates as to future profitability.
Such predictions are no doubt fraught with uncertainty, but market
participants nevertheless make investments designed to pay off in
market share and profitability over the longer term. The fact that no
contract may have been formed regarding the future sale of services
does not diminish the fact that health care providers' investments in
134. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899.
135. Connolly, 475 U.S. at 223 (quoted in Concrete Pipe, 113 S. Ct. at 2290).
136. Id.
137. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2903 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Richard A. Epstein, Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1369,
1370-71 (1993).
138. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979).
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training and facilities may be significantly damaged by government
regulation. Even so, the Court treats such interests in "future profits"
as "a slender reed upon which to rest a takings claim."'13 9
The most plausible explanation for the Court's rather severe re-
striction on the types of property interests it will protect against regu-
latory takings is, again, the Court's apparent unwillingness to
undermine legislative prerogatives to regulate economic matters.
Land-use regulation affects interests that closely resemble those typi-
cally associated with eminent domain proceedings. It is, of course,
those proceedings to which the Takings Clause most clearly applies.
140
Personal property, contracts, and business goodwill, on the other
hand, are the types of interests most likely to be diminished in value
by broad-based economic regulation.
State and federal regulation of health care has been intense, so
additional regulation should come as no surprise. Even the dramatic
changes that would accompany health care reform could hardly be
characterized as unexpected. 141 As noted earlier, the fact of preexist-
ing regulation raises a more fundamental problem-locating the mar-
ket baseline against which the economic effects of governmental
regulation should be measured. The cost crisis (and with it the eco-
139. See Chang v. United States, 859 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Kearney & Trecker
Corp. v. United States, 688 F.2d 780, 783-84 (Ct. Cl. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051
(1983).
Professor Merrill argues that a physician who is denied access to an unregulated mar-
ket might effectively be deprived of his "right to practice medicine," a property interest to
which the procedural component of the Due Process Clause would apply. Merrill, supra
note 123, at 659. Merrill argues that, at a minimum, physicians would be entitled to indi-
vidual post-deprivation hearings on whether they were entitled to relief from group price
controls. Merrill, supra note 123, at 660-62. The "right to practice medicine" clearly does
mean that a physician has a property interest in his or her professional license, Dent v.
West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114,123 (1889), and in certain cases, in medical staff privileges. See
Lowe v. Scott, 959 F.2d 323, 335-36 (1st Cir. 1992). However, it is far from clear that the
"right to practice medicine" includes the right to practice medicine in an unregulated mar-
ket. Cf Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 527-28 (1934) (upholding price controls on
milk and rejecting the idea that the Constitution "guarantee[s] the unrestricted privilege to
engage in a business or to conduct it as one pleases"); Faucher v. Rodziewicz, 891 F.2d 864,
869 (11th Cir. 1990) (economic value of staff privileges is not a protected property
interest).
140. Cf Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982)
(noting that in the case of a permanent physical occupation of property, "the property
owner entertains a historically rooted expectation of compensation, and the character of
the invasion is qualitatively more intrusive than perhaps any other category of property
regulation").
141. At least since the end of World War II, politicians have regularly proposed govern-
ment-intensive comprehensive health care reform. See STARR, supra note 73, at 280-90,
363-78, 393-405.
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nomic success of the medical profession and other health care busi-
nesses) can be attributed in large part to government involvement in
the health care sector. For the last fifty years, most government inter-
vention in the health care sector has enhanced the economic interests
of health care providers." 2 Many, though not all, of the cost-contain-
ment problems experienced in American health care can be attributed
to these government actions. To be sure, the industry has come to rely
on government cooperation, and significant capital investments have
been made on the basis of the expectation of the continuation of the
status quo. In fairness, however, players in an industry that has sought
and accepted so much government protection and largesse cannot
claim a constitutional entitlement to the perpetual continuation of
gains previously won in the legislature. Nor should they expect the
Constitution to prevent legislative actions to remedy the perceived
negative effects of such programs.
IV. Health Care Price Controls and the Public Utility Cases
A. The Significance of Public Utility Status
Some courts reviewing takings claims based on price regulation
have concluded that the balancing test discussed above should not be
applied. 43 Instead, they have employed the "fair and reasonable re-
142. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
143. Some cases appear to assume price regulation amounts to a per se taking in the
absence of mitigating factors such as the presence of an important government interest, see
Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 513, 519 (1944); Western States Meat Packers Ass'n v.
Dunlop, 482 F.2d 1401 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1973); International Bhd. of Elec. Workers
v. Boldt, 481 F.2d 1392 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1973); Minden Beef Co. v. Cost of Living
Council, 362 F. Supp. 298 (D. Nev. 1973), limited duration of the controls, see Block v.
Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135, 157 (1921); John N. Drobak, Constitutional Limits on Price and Rent
Contro" The Lessons of Utility Regulation, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 107, 118-19 (1986); but see
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1986)
(requiring compensation for temporary taking), or the ability of the regulated firm to with-
draw from the market, see Bowles, 321 U.S. at 517; Garelick v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 913, 916
(2d Cir. 1993); Whitney v. Heckler, 780 F.2d 963, 972 (11th Cir. 1986); Minnesota Ass'n of
Health Care Facilities v. Minnesota Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 742 F.2d 442, 446 (8th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985); Drobak, supra, at 119-22; Walter Pond, The Law
Governing Public Utility Rates: A Response to Recent Judicial and Academic Misconcep-
tions, 41 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 5 (1989).
Recent cases rejecting the applicability of the "reasonable return" standard of price
regulation have tended to regard the regulated party's ability to withdraw from the regu-
lated market as dispositive. See, e.g., Garelick, 987 F.2d at 913; Whitney, 780 F.2d at 963.
The U.S. Supreme Court case most often cited in connection with such a view is Bowles.
While Bowles does rely in part on the regulated party's ability to withdraw from the mar-
ket, it does so in reliance on Wilson v. Brown, 137 F.2d 348 (Emer. Ct. App. 1943). Wilson
suggests that the decisive distinction is whether the regulated party is a public utility. Id. at
351-52; Drobak, supra, at 114 n.28; see infra note 148.
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turn" standard used by the Court to review public utility ratemaking
under the Takings Clause.144 Under the fair and reasonable return
standard, public utility regulators must set rates at a level that allows
the utility to recoup its reasonably and prudently incurred costs plus a
reasonable rate of return; otherwise, the rate is held to constitute a
taking.' 45 Other courts have applied neither the balancing test nor the
fair and reasonable return standard, holding instead that price regula-
tion can never effect a taking as long as the regulated parties are le-
gally free to abandon the market.14
Cases automatically applying the fair and reasonable return stan-
dard to all types of price regulation and those rejecting the possibility
of a taking where the regulated party can withdraw from the market
are both mistaken because they take the fact of price regulation, by
itself, to be of signal importance. Price regulation, however, is largely
indistinguishable from nonprice regulation in terms of both economics
and of legal doctrine. The economic well-being of a seller of goods or
services may be affected equally by either type of regulation. Price
regulation limits the amount of revenue the seller can obtain for his
goods or services. Nonprice regulation increases the seller's expenses
(for example, by mandating quality standards). In either case the
seller will attempt in the first instance to pass along the cost of the
regulation to the buyer-perhaps by reducing the quality of the prod-
uct in the case of price regulation, or, in the case of regulation increas-
ing the seller's expenses, by raising the price. And in either case, the
regulation might make it impractical for the seller to sell goods or
services at all. The damage done to the seller's property interests in
each case is constitutionally indistinguishable. There is no reason to
assume ex ante that price regulation is a greater burden on a business
144. See Guaranty Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Gates, 916 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that
Nevada rate rollback statute was unconstitutional because statute failed to include a proce-
dure for contesting confiscatory rates); see also Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 693 P.2d 261
(Cal.), affd, 475 U.S. 260 (1986) (rent control statute that allowed reasonable return was
constitutional). But see Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Garamendi, 790 F. Supp. 938, 950-51
(N.D. Cal. 1992) (explaining that Guaranty National was decided primarily on procedural
due process grounds); see also Birkenfield v. City of Berkeley, 550 P.2d 1001 (Cal. 1976)
(holding that rent control was within state's police power if the regulation was reasonably
calculated to eliminate excessive rents and at the same time provide landlords with just and
reasonable return on their property). As a practical matter, the "fair and reasonable re-
turn" standard, even if applied, does not provide great protection for regulated parties.
See Pierce, supra note 46, at 2031 (noting that Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas
Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944), has been "widely interpreted as a de facto withdrawal" by the
judiciary from ratemaking oversight).
145. Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 (1989); Hope, 320 U.S. at 591.
146. See supra note 143.
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than is nonprice regulation, and, accordingly, no reason to create sep-
arate constitutional standards for its review.
147
Instead, the "reasonable return" standard is appropriately em-
ployed in lieu of the traditional balancing test only when the regulated
entity is a public utility; it is the nature of the utility enterprise and of
utility regulation, and not the presence of price controls, that is consti-
tutionally significant."4 Public utility regulation merits close scrutiny
147. The Supreme Court recognized this fact as early as 1934:
The thought seems.., to have persisted that there is something peculiarly sacro-
sanct about the price one may charge for what he makes or sells, and that, how-
ever able to regulate other elements of manufacture or trade, with incidental
effect upon price, the state is incapable of directly controlling the price itself. This
view was negatived many years ago....
Price control, like any other form of regulation, is unconstitutional only if
arbitrary, discriminatory or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the legislature is
free to adopt, and hence an unwarranted interference with individual liberty.
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934); see also Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar.
Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 223 (1986) (including price controls in general category of routinely-
created acts "regulating commercial and other human affairs"); cf. Merrill, supra note 123,
at 663-665 (discussing the circumstances under which government regulation amounts to a
"price control").
148. See Duquesne, 488 U.S at 307 (noting the "partly public, partly private" nature of
public utility property); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 522-26 (1898) (rate regulation could
deprive carrier of its property); see also Wilson v. Brown, 137 F.2d 348, 351-52 (Emer. Ct.
App. 1943) ("[W]e are satisfied that principles derived from the law of eminent domain are
not the proper constitutional criterion for determining the validity of a nation-wide pro-
gram of price and rent control enacted by Congress under its war powers. In the case of
public utilities there is an extensive and permanent regulation of the use of the properties
in the public interest, of which the regulation of rates is only a part. The situation more
nearly approaches a 'taking' of the properties, or the use thereof, than in the case of war-
time rent regulation." (cited in Bowles, 321 U.S. at 517)).
The Court's decision in The Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968), is
consistent with the statement in the text. The independent natural gas producers whose
rates were at issue in Permian Basin were not public utilities. Nevertheless, the Court's
apparent use of the Hope doctrine to evaluate their claim is readily explainable. The Court
divided its analysis of the constitutional status of the price controls in Permian Basin into
three parts: (1) whether the legislature has the power to impose price controls, id. at 768-
69; (2) whether there is any constitutional obstacle to group, as opposed to individualized,
ratemaking, id. at 269-70; and (3) whether the rates might amount to a taking. Id. at 770.
The first two issues deal primarily with the limits, if any, the substantive component of
the Due Process Clause imposes on price regulation. Under the Due Process Clause, a
legislature or agency may engage in price regulation. Id. at 768. Price regulation is not
invalid per se under either the Due Process Clause or Takings Clause, id. at 769, but the
ratemaking body must have before it information sufficient to permit it to have some ra-
tional basis for the rates it sets. Id. Further, the rates may be neither "'arbitrary, discrimi-
natory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free to adopt . . ."' Id. at
769-70 (quoting Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 539). The third part of the analysis (relating only to
the Takings Clause) is unusual because the gas producers, while themselves not public
utilities, were regulated under the Natural Gas Act. In a case involving a public utility, the
Court had already concluded that rates made pursuant to the requirements of the Natural
Gas Act were adequate under the Takings Clause. Id. at 770 (citing Federal Power
because of its intensity and the virtual appropriation of private utility
property into public service.149 As a result, judicial analysis proceeds
directly to the compensation issue; that is, whether the utility is receiv-
ing a fair return. 50
Public utility ratemaking, then, may aptly be characterized as an
additional per se category in regulatory takings analysis.' 51 The exten-
sive regulatory and service requirements imposed on public utilities
verge on a physical taking of the utility's plant and other property and
are easily analogized with traditional concerns about state "appropria-
ltion" of property. Moreover, limiting per se treatment to the category
of public utilities permits oversight of public utility rates without in-
fringing upon the legislature's general authority to set economic policy
in broader contexts.'52 Such oversight may be especially appropriate
because individual utilities may be substantially more likely to be sin-
gled out in the legislative process than an entire industry. Also, pro-
viding individual review of decisions affecting public utilities, which
are usually monopolists in their respective service areas, does not
Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575,586 (1942)). There was thus no need to
reach the substantive issue of whether non-utility price regulation constituted a taking in
the case at bar. If the rates for the independent natural gas producers were made in con-
formity with the Natural Gas Act, they would be constitutionally sufficient in any event.
149. While there is no precise definition of what constitutes a public utility, several
characteristics are frequently associated with public utility status: (1) economies of scale,
(2) the provision of an "essential" service, (3) heavy capital requirements, (4) production
of services or nonstorable goods, (5) demand and cost fluctuation, (6) exclusive franchises,
and (7) the obligation to supply services to anyone willing to pay the price. JAMES C.
BONBRIGHT ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATEs 8-10 (1988). Regulated aspects
of public utilities include "[p]rices; entry and exit; new, extended or abandoned service
offerings; service standards; financial structure; accounting methods, and a host of other
elements." Id. at 6.
Using these rough characteristics as a guide, one might not be surprised to find that
hospitals in a jurisdiction that regulated prices and controlled entry into the market
through certificate of need and other programs could be classified as "public utilities."
Indeed, most hospital ratemaking appears to be based on a public utility model, frequently
guaranteeing the hospital a "fair and reasonable return" as a statutory matter. See, e.g.,
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2803(2)(a)(ii) (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1993) (rate schedule
"shall be reasonable and adequate to meet the costs which must be incurred by efficiently
and economically operated facilities"). Where a regulating agency has complied with a
statutory scheme designed to ensure a fair and reasonable return, a regulated hospital is
unlikely to be able to get a court to second-guess ratemaking on constitutional grounds.
See Hope, 320 U.S. at 606-07.
150. See Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 308 (taking occurs "[i]f the rate does not afford suffi-
cient compensation").
151. See id. at 307 ("This partly public, partly private status of utility property creates
its own set of questions under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.").
152. See Pierce, supra note 46, at 2031 (characterizing the Hope doctrine as withdrawal
of judicial scrutiny).
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place an impossible administrative requirement on the other branches
of government.153
B. Price Regulation of Entities Other than Public Utilities
The question remains, however, as to how price regulation of
firms other than public utilities should be analyzed. As noted above, a
significant number of cases appear to hold that price regulation can
never amount to a regulatory taking where the parties are legally free
to abandon the regulated market.'54 Under this view, if price regula-
tion is valid under substantive due process scrutiny, the Takings
Clause would not impose any additional obstacle to its
implementation.
It is hard to imagine a plausible theoretical justification for the
idea that, unlike other forms of broad-based economic regulation,
price controls could never amount to a regulatory taking where the
regulated party is free to abandon the market. 55 Price regulation is as
likely to inflict economic damage on regulated parties as nonprice reg-
ulation. While nonprice regulation (outside the per se categories) is
rarely found to offend the Takings Clause, the Court has nonetheless
declined to hold categorically that it never results in a taking, even
where parties are legally free to abandon the regulated market. Price
controls merit similar treatment. 56
153. See The Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747,767 (1968) (administrative
difficulties legitimate grounds under constitutional analysis); Bowles v. Willingham, 321
U.S. 503, 517 (1944).
154. See cases cited supra note 143.
155. Some courts have been understandably skeptical that a party's legal ability to with-
draw from the regulated market should be constitutionally decisive. See Guaranty Nat'l
Ins. Co. v. Gates, 916 F.2d 508 (9th Cir 1990); Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmajian, 771 P.2d
1247 (Cal. 1989); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 263 N.E.2d 698
(Mass. 1970); Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council, 350 A.2d 1, 14-15 n.9 (N.J. 1975); see
also Drobak, supra note 143, at 123-30 (suggesting that where a firm has invested in spe-
cialized assets which cannot be readily converted to other uses, economic theories of op-
portunistic behavior suggest that the "reasonable return" standard should apply).
Undoubtedly, the fact that a public utility is statutorily required to continue providing
service despite unfairly low prices has been a significant factor in judicial decisions treating
utility rate regulation as a per se taking. See Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 307; Bowles, 321 U.S. at
513. Nevertheless, the fact that price controls generally do not constitute a per se taking,
see Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 1531 (1992); Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485
U.S. 1, 13 (1988); FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245,252 (1987), does not necessi-
tate a conclusion that they could never amount to a regulatory taking. See Merrill, supra
note 123, at 647 (arguing that Yee and Pennell are inconsistent with the "legal obligation"
theory).
156. See Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211,223 (1986); Hope, 320
U.S. at 601 ("The fixing of prices, like other applications of the police power, may reduce
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Despite the flaws in their reasoning, cases holding that price regu-
lation can never effect a taking when the regulated party is free to
leave the market are easily understandable in practical terms. The
Supreme Court's general unwillingness to use the Takings Clause to
invalidate broad-based business regulation is well-known. As argued
above, the main reason for the Court's decisions is to avoid threaten-
ing legislative prerogatives. 157 Cases that simply dismiss takings chal-
lenges to price controls outside of the public utilities context are likely
to be consistent in result, if not in reasoning, with those that rely on ad
hoc balancing. Regardless of how the decision is framed, the Court
has consistently refused to find that price controls outside the context
of utility ratemaking amount to regulatory takings.'58 On the other
hand, since other types of broad-based regulation are not immune
from Takings Clause scrutiny, price regulation should not be automat-
ically validated merely because the claimant is legally free to abandon
the market.
Conclusion
The balancing test employed in regulatory takings cases suggests
that takings claims by health care providers based on the imposition of
price controls are unlikely to be successful. The economic interests of
providers so strongly resemble those the Lochner-era Court protected
from regulation in the name of "liberty of contract" that today's Court
could not find a regulatory taking without resurrecting the political
conflicts that led it to abandon Lochner in the first place. Moreover,
there is little practical cause for worry that providers are being "un-
fairly singled out" in Congress' zeal to make things better for society.
Given the political clout of those who stand to lose from health care
reform and their remarkably successful track record in Congress and
state legislatures, the political process seems likely to allocate social
benefits and burdens fairly over the long haul.
Even if it were desirable to subject health care price controls to
judicial review, it would be an impossible task. The impact of price
controls and other features of health care reform legislation would
have to be weighed against offsetting beneficial features of reform leg-
islation. Just as important, perceived adverse effects should be evalu-
the value of the property which is being regulated. But the fact that the value is reduced
does not mean that the regulation is invalid.").
157. See supra Part I.C.
158. See, e.g., Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1522; Pennell, 485 U.S. at 1; Bowles, 321 U.S. at 503;
Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
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ated in light of market trends that might have resulted in similar
economic difficulties for providers and in light of government actions
that previously benefited them. The difficulty of making such judg-
ments counsels for judicial caution in overruling the decisions of rep-
resentative bodies, especially since patients have a stake in a smoothly
functioning health care system. If price controls so restrict the eco-
nomic opportunities of providers that patient care is compromised,
there should be adequate political incentives available to resolve
inequities.
This is not to say that the arguments against health care price
controls as policy should not be taken seriously. Depending on the
level at which prices are set, price controls may produce results that
are unsettling not only to health care providers but to patients as well.
If the Court holds firm to modern constitutional doctrine, however, it
will leave questions as to the wisdom and fairness of health policy,
including price controls, to the elected branches of government.
